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DICTA

CASE COMMENTS
INSURANCEMANSLAUGHTER NO BAR TO INHERITANCE. In the case of Strickland v. Wysowatcky,' Acquilla Cole
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for having caused the
death of his wife, Claudina Cole. In the probate proceedings Acquilla's representative claimed, and the court granted him the
entire estate of deceased which consisted solely of the proceeds
of a life insurance policy made payable to her estate.
The administrator specified as error the trial judge's ruling
that the conviction for the manslaughter of Claudina Cole does
not prevent his inheritance as her sole next of kin. His contention was supported on two grounds. The first being that a beneficiary of a life insurance policy who feloniously causes the death
of the insured forfeits all rights he may have under the policy,
and secondly, that it would be contrary to public policy for him
to collect the estate because of the well established rule that one
may not, in a court of law, profit from his own wrong.
The Supreme Court in affirming the lower court's decision disposed of the first theory on the grounds that this case involved
the distribution of an estate and was not a suit by a beneficiary
against an insurer for the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The
court having found that the company had already paid the administrator, resolved the case and refuted the second theory of the
plaintiff in error by the application of the Colorado Statute of
Descent and Distribution and a recent Colorado case. Under our
statute the husband, Acquilla Cole, was the sole next of kin of
his wife, there being no issue from the marriage.2 Also sec. 12
of chap. 176 did not disqualify Cole, because he was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter, and the statute only presents a bar to
the heirs or devisees who are convicted of first or second degree
murder. 3 Finally, Colorado does not seem to follow the maxim
that one may not profit from his own wrong when the statute is
also involved in the same question.
The above may be most forcefully illustrated by a quotation
from a Colorado case, Smith v. Greenburg,4 which was the basis
for the decision in this case. In the Smith case the jury found that
one Milford cut his wife's throat, and then his daughter's. After
these events he killed himself by carbon monoxide poisoning. Because of the proximity in time of all these happenings Milford
never went to trial. Concerning the property held by Milford and
I Strickland v. Wysowatcky, .... Colo.....1952-1953 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4,
p. 50.
2COLO. STAT. ANN-., c. 176, §1 (1935).
Id. at §12.
Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P. 2d 514 (1950).
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his wife as tenants in common, the Supreme Court ruled that
her interest descended by the statute to Milford and their daughter
in equal portions. As the daughter was the next to die after Mrs.
Milford, and as Milford was her sole heir, he inherited her estate
also. In making this decision the Supreme Court quoted 26 C. J. S.
1055 and seemingly adopted what was therein stated to be the
majority view for the law of this state:
. . . The operation of a statute of descent is not
affected by the fact that the death of the intestate was
caused by the heir apparent in order to obtain the inheritance at once, and therefore an heir who causes or procures the death of the intestate in order that he may
inherit the estate at once is not disqualified from taking
in the absence of a statute expressly disqualifying him.
There is however a strong minority view to the contrary,
based on the theory that a person should not profit from
his own wrong; and it is said that this view displays a
tendency to become a majority view. To meet the difficulties arising in such a case, several states have enacted
valid statutes intended to prevent a person who has
feloniously caused the death of decedent from inheriting
or receiving any part of the estate of decedent; but such
a statute must be strictly construed and in some situations is held not applicable. A statute disqualifying one
who has been convicted of the murder of deceased does
not apply in absence of such conviction as where there
has been a conviction of manslaughter only, or the person
who committed the homicide was insane at the time or
committed suicide shortly thereafter.
Although there was no indication that Milford had killed his
wife and daughter for their money, the court indicated by this
quotation and the decision in that case that the wrongful killer
will not be denied his inheritance from the one killed unless he
is precluded by the express terms of the statute, and it would seem
that, the court made it quite clear that in these circumstances,
the maxim that one may not profit from his own wrong will not
apply in this state.
It thus appears that in deciding this case the court merely
followed its precedent established in the Smith case and refused
to enlarge upon the limitations found in the statute itself. Decisions such as these two seem rather harsh under the circumstances
of these two cases. However, the decision seems justified where,
as here, the statute of descent and distribution, or provision for
succession, is plain and unambiguous in its terms and where there
is no room for construction of interpretation. The statute operates
solely within its own terms and vests in the heir such estate as
he is entitled to immediately upon the death of the intestate from
whom the inheritance comes, without reference to any question
of criminal responsibility.
HOWARD PARKS.

